The 21 listed pig producers slaughtered a combined 1566.97 ten thousand commercial pigs in 10, down 268.57 ten thousand year over year, a decrease of 14.63%, marking the largest single-month contraction so far this year. The reduction was concentrated: Muyuan, Wen’s, New Hope, and Tianbang Food slaughtered a combined 1127.05 ten thousand pigs, down approximately 207 ten thousand year over year. Calculated against the total reduction among the sample, they accounted for approximately 77% of the decline, indicating that proactive production controls by leading large-scale producers have moved from statements to implementation. This is the most important structural change in the current cycle: at the bottoms of previous cycles, capacity reduction relied mainly on the passive exit of small and medium-sized independent farmers; this time, the reduction is being led by the largest producers in terms of slaughter volume.

 

 

I. Slaughter structure: year-over-year contraction of 14.63% in a single month; four leading producers account for approximately 77% of the reduction

 

The most direct change in the 10 sample data is that total slaughter volume shifted from year-over-year growth to decline. Structural divergence is key to understanding this month’s data. Of the 21 sample companies, 12 reported lower slaughter volumes year over year, while 9 continued to grow. Among the top five companies by slaughter volume, four cut output, while only Zhengbang Technology maintained growth. Muyuan Foods, Wen’s Foodstuff Group, New Hope, and Tianbang Food slaughtered 591.30, 352.72, 128.69, and 54.34 ten thousand pigs, respectively. Combined, the four slaughtered 1127.05 ten thousand pigs, down approximately 207 ten thousand year over year, a decline of approximately 15.5%, accounting for approximately 77% of the reduction among the sample companies. This means the overall contraction in 10 was not the result of accumulated, scattered exits by small and medium-sized operators; instead, it was highly concentrated among companies at the leading edge of the industry cost curve.

 

The extent of reductions varied considerably. Among the 12 companies that recorded a year-on-year decline in market hog sales, 7 saw declines of more than 20%, accounting for nearly six tenths of the companies that reduced sales. Jinxinnong was relatively small in scale: it sold 7.58 ten thousand head in 10 month, down 8.70 ten thousand head year on year, a decline of 53.02%, the largest among the companies in the sample. The number of companies with declines exceeding 20% is no longer an isolated case, indicating that reductions are relatively widespread and more closely resemble capacity cuts than technical fluctuations in the timing of month-end sales.

 

Companies that grew against the trend also warrant analysis. Zhenghong Technology grew by 142.52% year on year, while Zhengbang Technology, Shennong Group, TianKang Biotech, Aonong Biotechnology, Lihua Group, Luoniushan, Kemin Foods, and Tianyu Bio maintained growth. Growing companies were mostly medium-sized businesses with a low base in the past or in an expansion phase. Their offsetting effect made the industry's overall capacity reduction uneven and was one reason the decline in the sample's total volume did not widen further. An industry-wide consensus on reducing production capacity is taking shape, but companies' strategic choices differ.

 

The contrast between a single month's contraction and cumulative growth is the key constraint in this cycle that requires close attention. From 1 to 10 month, cumulative sales by the sample reached approximately 1.57 hundred million head, still up 308.80 ten thousand head year on year, an increase of approximately 2.01%. This indicates that the reduction in 10 month changed only the marginal growth rate and has not yet changed the year's total supply. The inventory of finishing pigs built up through earlier capacity releases, secondary fattening, and large pigs held back from sale form a hidden supply pool that is difficult to absorb in the short term. To determine whether supply has reached a turning point, it is not enough to look at the year-on-year change for a single month; the direction of the cumulative year-on-year change must also be observed.

 

II. Prices and costs: Selling prices have fallen across the board below the break-even line, and losses have spread from individual companies to become systemic.

 

The contraction in market hog shipments has not yet been reflected in prices. At the monitoring point, the national average price of external three-way crossbred live pigs was 4.24 yuan per jin (8.48 yuan per kilogram), a slight rebound from the previous period. However, the price level continued to edge down throughout 10 month, with the second-half low tested repeatedly. Among the 17 companies that disclosed their average selling prices, the average selling price in 10 month was 4.94 yuan per jin, down 0.40 yuan per jin, or approximately 7.5%, from 5.34 yuan per jin in 9 month. In a month when year-on-year supply had only just turned negative, prices still fell month on month, indicating that both demand-side drag and pressure from existing supply were present.

 

Price tiers reveal differences in the distribution of losses. In 10 month, the average price at 11 companies fell below 5 yuan per jin, accounting for 64.7% of the sample; another 3 companies averaged only 5.0–5.4 yuan per jin, just above the 5-yuan threshold; only Dongrui Shares, Jinxinnong, and Jingji Smart Agriculture—3 companies—remained at 5.4–5.9 yuan per jin. Companies maintaining higher selling prices generally rely on regional sales-market price differentials, herd structure, or their own slaughtering channels. At current price levels, however, this gap can only cushion losses, not reverse the direction of profitability.

 

Cost-side pressures have become a rigid constraint. The average full cost of the sampled listed hog companies was approximately 6.14 yuan per jin, while the average price in 10 was 1.20 yuan per jin lower. On a static basis, using a standard market weight of 120 kilograms, the loss per head was approximately 288 yuan. Including the cost of piglets purchased earlier at high prices and financing expenses at some companies, actual losses were deeper. Leading companies can limit their losses through cost advantages, while companies further along the cost curve face both falling prices and cash outflows. Losses have spread from an operational problem at individual companies to a systemic industry-wide condition.

 

Demand has not provided an offset. Slaughter data from Zhuochuang Information’s sample showed that the average daily slaughter volume of large-scale slaughtering companies in 10 fell year over year. Frozen-product warehouse capacity utilization remained high, and slaughtering companies focused mainly on working through earlier inventories, with little willingness to actively replenish stocks at lower prices. Southern China’s preserved-meat season began its initial buildup only in the second half of 10, with a material boost concentrated in the middle and latter part of 11. Peak-season demand elasticity was weaker than in the same period historically. The imbalance of strong supply and weak demand did not improve in 10 despite reduced marketings. This is the direct reason price recovery lagged capacity adjustment.

 

Three. Underlying capacity logic: accelerated reduction in the number of productive sows; a time lag of 10 months determines the pace of the turning point

 

Weak prices and reduced marketings coexist, rooted in the lag in capacity transmission. Large-scale enterprises are reducing marketings, driven by both policy guidance and market-based losses: the live pig capacity regulation mechanism continues to be implemented, guiding leading players to adjust herd size in an orderly manner; sustained losses are forcing companies to proactively cull low-productivity breeding sows, optimize herd structure, and control the pace of marketings of finished pigs. Together, these factors are shifting this round of capacity reduction from passive herd liquidation to proactive production control.

 

National capacity indicators confirm the direction of the trend. At the end of the third quarter, the national breeding sow inventory stood at 3602 ten thousand head, down 10.7% year on year and 4.7% quarter on quarter, approximately 148 ten thousand head ( 3.9%) below the regulated holding level of 3750 ten thousand head. This was the first time in recent years that it had fallen below the baseline. Mysteel’s high-frequency sample showed a further month-on-month decline of 1.57% in 10, marking 9 consecutive months of month-on-month destocking, with the rate of destocking picking up from the third quarter. Capacity contraction has shifted from a policy target to observable data.

 

Based on a biological cycle of approximately 10 months, the decline in market hog shipments currently being observed corresponds to sow culling from the end of 2025 to the beginning of 2026. The accelerated destocking since the third quarter of 2026 will not translate into a substantive contraction in market hog supply until after the second quarter of 2027. This lag means that expectations of easing supply pressure in 2027 are directionally sound, but the period from the fourth quarter of 2026 to the first quarter of 2027 remains a window in which supply inertia coincides with the seasonal demand lull.

 

The changing structure of the entities reducing capacity is a key difference between the current cycle and previous cycles. In the earlier period, capacity reduction was mainly driven by small-scale farmers and small and medium-sized farms passively clearing their herds, with rapid exits at low cost. In the current cycle, leading listed hog companies have become the main entities actively reducing capacity. However, large-scale businesses have more financing channels and greater balance-sheet flexibility, making the marginal cost of exiting each unit of capacity higher. As a result, capacity clearance has been significantly slower than among small-scale farmers. At the same time, strategies have diverged among companies, with some entities expanding against the trend, offsetting the overall pace of capacity reduction across the industry. Together, these factors have prolonged the time spent at the bottom.

 

IV. Driving Factors and Outlook

 

The current drivers can be summarized as follows: marginal improvement on the supply side has emerged, but pressure from existing stocks and weak demand continue to dominate prices; cost rigidity means that even if prices rebound, earnings recovery will lag behind the price rebound. The main factors are broken down below by direction, mechanism, and constraints.

 

In the short term (from 2026 year 11 month to the first quarter of 2027), prices are highly likely to fluctuate within a low range. The curing season and reserve adjustments may bring temporary, pulse-like rebounds, but with frozen-product inventories high, slaughterhouses pushing prices down, and household demand for meat relatively inelastic, the rebound will be limited and unlikely to develop into a sustained upward trend. Cumulative sample slaughter volumes are still growing, which means that total supply has not tightened during the year; any rebound will quickly encounter adjustments to the pace of slaughter.

 

A mid-cycle turning point requires cross-validation of two signals. First, the decline in the breeding sow inventory must continue, without a rebound in restocking. If the inventory posts a quarter-on-quarter increase in the first quarter of 2027年, the window for supply contraction will shift later. Second, the year-on-year change in listed pig companies’ cumulative sales volume must turn from positive to negative, directly demonstrating a substantive easing of pressure from existing supply. Only when both signals are present are the conditions in place to confirm a cyclical bottom. Judging a reversal solely from a single month’s year-on-year change turning negative risks underestimating supply inertia.

 

The dimensions of competition at the enterprise level have shifted. The industry’s focus has moved from expanding scale and competing on sales volume to cost control, cash-flow security, herd efficiency, and balance-sheet management: highly leveraged, high-cost operators with relatively low PSY will continue to be forced out during this cycle’s trough, while leaders with sound cash flow and a leading position on the cost curve will expand their market share during the low-price phase. Expectations of a cyclical turning point are building, but the realization of an earnings recovery depends on the persistence of sow herd reductions and marginal improvement in consumer demand, rather than short-term fluctuations in monthly sales volume. (Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 卓创资讯, Mysteel, and other sources; compiled)